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PROGRAM

The Tomorrow Show

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SUBJECT

Full Text

TOM SNYDER: Best seat in the house, and not a packed house at that in Studio 6 in New York City. Good morning, everybody. We're on the air tonight with Mr. George Bush, who at the present time is the Director of the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency. George Bush has done all kinds of things during the past five years. He has been the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. He has been Chairman of the Republican National Committee. He has been the chief representative of the United States to the People's Republic of China, and he has been, and is now, the Director of the CIA. And he'll join us here in just a couple of seconds.

SNYDER: But as I say, tonight we have the Director of the CIA, Dr. George -- or Mr. George Bush with us. And we'll begin with Mr. Bush after these announcements, and I hope all of you will stay tuned.

Are we going to see the seats again here now? Notice, if we show the seats again, the texture of the material here, material purchased by NBC at great expense to our pride and reputation, last seen at the porno "X" theatre on Times Square; newly cleaned and refurbished for Studio 6-A, New York. that band.

SNYDER: And now here is George Bush, the Director of the CIA, which I want to talk about tonight. But I would like to ask you about the importance of the death of Chairman Mao and the effect your think it might have on relations between this country

OFFICES IN: NEW YORK . LOS ANGELES . CHICAGO . DETROIT . AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES and Mainland China, based upon the fact that you were our representative there until just recently.

DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH: I would say that nobody is going to replace Chairman Mao. You really have to be in China for a while to see the pervasive nature of his presence and of his impact on China. He gave the People's Republic -- well, he gave birth to the People's Republic of China and he gave China a certain unity and destiny, sense of destiny that it hadn't had in many, many decades. And so I think it's fair to say, certainly it's my judgment, and I guess what's more important to your many listeners, Tom, the judgment of many in the intelligence community that Chairman Mao is so special that we don't look for a single replacement to him. And I think it's going to take time to sort out what China does in terms of leadership. Hua Kuo-feng, who is now the number one man there, is a strong leader, but he lacks the following that the Chairman had. He's kind of moderating between extremes, or two factions, you might say. And I think that China will move forward in terms of kind of a collegial government for a while, sort out its new direction as it goes along.

I don't see anything in the death of Chairman Mao, who indeed, along with President Nixon, made the opening: I don't see anything to reverse that. And I don't -- I don't think, and it's not my judgment, that China will move precipitously towards a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

So. . . .

SNYDER: Excuse me....

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, go ahead.

SNYDER: ... Is there another faction within China which would sooner have China not become too friendly with the United States?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. There're people there that feel that way. There're probably some there that would like to see them closer to the Soviet Union. But their line has been established, and we don't see any radical shifts either towards the Soviet Union or away from the United States.

Now, there're some -- are relationships, the United States and China. I don't want to get into policy, because I'm in the intelligence business now, although I was involved, as you pointed out, in the highest levels of our China policy.

SNYDER: And you were the first person that we have sent there at that level in some time.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Second. David Bruce....

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Oh, excuse me. SNYDER:

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...my most illustrious predecessor....

SNYDER: Correct. Correct.

DIRECTOR BUSH: ... opened the thing. And I was just honored to follow in his distinguished footsteps. But nevertheless, I should stay away from policy considerations in our chatting here tonight.

But I would say that we don't look for anything drastic on all this. And I think that there will be a difficulty before the United States can establish full relations with China. we seek to fulfill the Shanghai Communique, which was the basic doctrine between our countries. We aspire to that. China, in my opinion, aspires to that.

So the death of Chairman Mao, traumatic, enormously important, not only in terms of China, but in terms of the world, in my view will not adversely affect the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

SNYDER: You've said twice in the preceding paragraph or two that now that you're in the intelligence business, you shouldn't talk about policy. Why not? You're a man with some political experience....

> DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure.

SNYDER: ...some policy experience, foreign policy as

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right.

SNYDER: Ambassador to the United Nations. Why now must you switch that off?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I've got to not only stay out of policy. Now if you say to me, how would you handle whether we ought to formalize our relations with China, I'd duck the question. And if you said to me, you know, who are you for for President, I'd duck that question. Because the Director of Central Intelligence must, one, stay out of partisan politics, clearly. And secondly, he must present to the President intelligence, finished intelligence, his judgment. Under the law it's my judgment that goes to the President, fortunately for the country, tempered and seasoned by enormous professional competence. But in the final analysis, under the law, it's my judgment. And that judgment has to go forward unfettered by policy considerations.

So we....

SNYDER: But can you not still speculate, based upon your.

broad experience....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I could....

SNYDER: ... as a private citizen?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I mean I have the liberty of doing it. Well, certainly if you turn those red lights off, I'll do it with But I'm not going to do it because the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA must not get into politics.

Turn the red lights off, but leave the camera on.

DIRECTOR BUSH: All of them are on.

[Laughter.]

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, but we -- we've got to -- we've got to -- we've got to let the policymakers set policy and let the intelligence go forward unfettered by policy constraints.

Say there's a policy that says country "a" and country "b," we must improve relations with them. And then the President embarks on a course of action that says let's go forward and give aid and improve it. And then we find certain intelligence that indicates that if we do, it'll cost us the support of countries "c" and "d." We shouldn't be saying, whoops, the President's committed to this policy that's going to support "a" and "b"; therefore don't you people bring me that bad news about "c" and "d." We've got to go forward with the way we see it. Call them as you see them, you know.

And so if I start speculating about what I would do to formalize relations between China and the United States, that's not my job. And I couldn't separate out George Bush from the role of the Director of Central Intelligence or the head of the CIA, both of which hats I wear, you see.

SNYDER: Not with the foreign policy for the United States.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yeah, you can't do it. And I sit in on the National Security Council meetings. I go to the cabinet meetings that are related to foreign affairs. I have direct access to the President. My access should be used to give finished intelligence, and let the policymakers, whoever is President, set the policy. And that's the way it should be, and that's the way it will be as long as I'm Director.

Can you tell me the difference between the kind of SNYDER: arrangement we now have with the People's Republic and how that differs from what will be when we have diplomatic relations....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Formal?

SNYDER: ...established with them formally?

DIRECTOR BUSH: You know, that's a tough and very fair question, and I will try to answer it.

Right now we are less than -- I was less than a full ambassador.

SNYDER: Well, okay. That really is the question. What was the difference between yourself and a full ambassador?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, we didn't go to the airport to greet foreign dignitaries. We didn't go to the Great Hall of the People on state occasions when a visiting foreign chief of state would come. There are certain protocolar differences that made our rank, our status something less than full. Until we have full diplomatic relations, our trade will not be -- not be enhanced. We won't have the best levels of trade, because certain problems that could accompany, could go along with full relations, such as the claims and assets question -- it could be solved before we have full relations; it might not be. But full relations kind of imply a solution to tough problems like that, you see.

So we -- but beyond that and beyond the protocol question, there are not too many substantive things.

SNYDER: Very subtle differences.

DIRECTOR BUSH: They're subtle differences. And yet formal relations -- there're certain consular things that go with it. And it would be better. I mean the United States seeks friendly relations with almost all countries. And certainly we seek friendly relations with the People's Republic of China.

Now you're getting me into policy. But I say this in confidence because of our adherence to the Shanghai Communique. But there are certain very difficult problems that remain before full relations can be established.

SNYDER: Without asking you about the policy problems, how long a period of time would you estimate, again based upon the work that you did there and the work that you did to make more peaceful, I guess is the word I'm looking for, or more quiet, the entrance of Mainland China into the United Nations when you were there? How long would it take for this to come about where we would have full, formal relations with the People's Republic?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I couldn't speculate. I can't, because.

there are certain major problems that exist that the President and the chief of state in China must wrestle with and that the secretary of State, in our instance, and the foreign minister, in theirs, must wrestle with. And so really speculation -- even if you asked me on a pure intelligence basis, not leaving out my judgment as the former chief of the U.S. liaison office in Peking, any answer I gave you would be pure speculation. And I really want to duck that one because I can't give you an honest, useful answer.

SNYDER: I understand that, sir. Now when that time comes, though, would we expect the President of the United States to make that announcement in concert, probably, with the Chinese Premier at that time?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I think if full diplomatic relations were established with the country that has a fourth of the world's population, you would look for both chiefs of states....

SNYDER: Major. Major.

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right, Tom. I mean this would be a major step forward. It would be a major thing, and it would be considered -- certainly considered and probably announced at the highest level.

SNYDER: All right, sir. I must pause for these words from our sponsors. We'll continue after these messages.

SNYDER: Why do you think it is that Richard Nixon was liked so apparently by Chairman Mao, to the point where he would invite him to come back even after Mr. Nixon left the White House?

DIRECTOR BUSH: President Nixon went to China, and he said, "Look, I'm here in the self-interest of the United States." There was no phoniness. The differences that he had articulated all his political life were still very much in his mind. He laid ' them right out on the table. Chairman Mao understood that. The reason the Chairman wanted to talk to President Nixon, in my view, is that he felt it was in the national interest of China, just as Nixon felt it was in the national interest of the United States. And there was a certain directness. There was a certain mutal respect. I think Chairman Mao thought President Nixon knew a lot about world affairs, and I think -- I know that President Nixon felt that Chairman Mao did. And so there was this kind of pragmatic understanding and self-respect -- mutal respect that gave President Nixon this special standing.

And when President Nixon went back, there was all this

kind of hogwash in the United States that the Chinese were trying to intervene in the New Hampshire Primary. I don't know if you remember that

> SNYDER: Surely. Yes, I do.

DIRECTOR BUSH: And it couldn't have been further from the truth. This was the fourth anniversary of the Shanghai Communique. There was this mutual respect, even though they have very vigorous differences. And the Chinese understood that President Nixon had kind of taken a gamble and had opened this relationship, and they were honoring him for that, not to intervene in some primary.

So I really think that's the reason that the President was there and what he said was the national interest of the United States -- "I'm here in our own self-interest." And the Chairman sat down and said "I'm here in the self-interest of China; now let's talk." And they seemed to get along and understand each other.

SNYDER: Do you think that the meetings could have gone a different direction in 1972 between Nixon and Mao Tse-tung, that it could not have come off as well as it did with the Communique of Shanghai at the end?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I....

You know, you label it as a gamble, that Nixon SNYDER: and Mao both took a gamble.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. And I think when they -- I think obviously Dr. Kissinger and others -- well, Dr. Kissinger did a lot of preliminary work. And I'm sure that they ironed out some of the more obvious hurdles, or smoothed those things out before the meeting took place, the meetings in Peking took place.

But, yes, I think up till the last minute there were some difficult negotiations and some problems that were unresolved before our then President went there. And so, yes, there was a gamble involved.

But I think once they decided to meet, there was enough at stake on both sides that some kind of agreement was destined to be forthcoming. And sure enough, it was.

The papers quoted you back in the SNYDER: Uh-huh. 1960s when you were, I believe, in political life as saying that you felt that the admission of Mainland China to the United Nations would destroy that organization. Yet ironically, you were the United States Ambassador to the United Nations when Mainland China was coming in. And though you fought long and well for Nationalist China to remain with Mainland China, it didn't work out that way.

What changed your mind? Was it -- was it

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, there were changed circumstances. .. You see, in the early '60s -- and that was a rather accurate quote -- there were some demands on the part of the People's Republic of China for admission to the U. N. that were unacceptable and remained unacceptable, not only to the United States, but to the majority. For example, they wanted to go back -- and just one of the ones -- go back and say that the U. S. was the aggressor in Korea. Now that was a quid pro quo or a sine qua non; without that we won't come to the United Nations. was the early '60s. Now that was unacceptable. To me, politician or fledgling interested individual in foreign affairs, I was saying to myself and to my potential constituents, "Look, I don't think that that should be, that the United States ought to go back...."

> SNYDER: That we ought to take a rap for that.

DIRECTOR BUSH: "...and take that kind of rap." And so there were changed circumstances.

And then when I was at the United Nations, why, we had the policy of dual representation, because we felt at that particular juncture in history -- and we articulated it as best we could, and we fought for it -- that though there's one China, there is indeed two governments at this juncture, that each claimed to be China. And we didn't feel that the Republic of China, or Taiwan, should be thrown out of the United Nations. Nations voted differently. And I was Ambassador at the time. I worked that side of the question. The People's Republic of China representatives that I later got to know very well in Peking and at the U. N. as well understood this. And we were on opposite sides of that. The decision was made. And then I determined, as U. S. Ambassador, to work as compatibly as possible with the will of the majority. And we did. And I think that's the proper way to conduct oneself. And I fought for what I believed, but people don't always do it the way the United States wants.

SNYDER: If we leave aside the glamour names in China, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and others, can you tell me something about the kind of people that are running that country at the bureaucratic level, people that might correspond to our cabinet officers in this country or to heads of intelligence, such as your-What kind of men and women are running that country in terms of their competence and their understanding of the world and China's place?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Oh, Tom, that's a tough one, because I mean it would be like saying what kind of men and women are running this country. I mean some people would say dedicated. Others would say too bureaucratic. Some would say aggressive, self-seeking. Others would say lazy and not -- not stimulated by their surroundings.

So I think -- I think it's pretty much the way it is the whole world over. But there is a dedication to Maoism. There is a central -- with the people in these government positions, a strong adherence to central doctrine. In fact, there's very little deviation, if any, from doctrine, particularly in foreign affairs. And I think there's a certain lack of individual freedom to move away from a line in foreign affairs. We have it; not too much, but we have some of that, of course.

But really, when you get down to the individuals, charming, able, well versed in languages....

SNYDER: Competent.

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...competent, good grasp of history. Their Foreign Minister, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, educated in Germany, philosopher, tremendously capable. If you can get him on your show, you'll be doing very well. Now you and he probably would come at it from different philosophical points of view. But capable. You're saying, "Are they able? Are they good?" Yes, they're strong.

SNYDER: The reason I ask that question is that there are many people in this country who so abhor all kinds of communist governments that they believe that the people running them are really wild-eyed revolutionaries who used to be in guerrilla armies and now, all of a sudden, are occupying places of power -- well, not all of a sudden any more in the instance of China -- who really are not competent politically and who really are not competent in terms of administering to a country that has one-quarter of the world's population.

Yet I would just have to think that they must have some very bright people there and some very able people who are more than foot soldiers who came out of the mountains in 1949 to govern a country.

DIRECTOR BUSH: If a guy was a foot soldier who came out of the mountains in 1949 to govern a country, that doesn't mean he's a dumb-dumb. But they get dumb guys; they get bright guys. They get fat ones; they get thin ones. They've got happy ones; they've got sour guys. They've got forthcoming people, and they've got recalcitrant, withdrawn people. And it's kind of like Washington, D. C. or Disneyland East. I mean it's the same the whole world over.

[Laughter.]

SNYDER: It's no secret that if China wanted to, it could reclaim Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa tomorrow morning, militarily, if they wished to do that.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Tom, you're going to get me in a lot of Go on; what's your question? policy.

SNYDER: No, I'm not. No, it's not going to be....

DIRECTOR BUSH: That's your statement; not mine. Go ahead.

I think they could if they wanted to. And I SNYDER: think that if they wished, for example, in 1999 or whenever the treaties on the new territories, the leases run out in Hong Kong, they could reclaim those militarily with absolutely no problem.

The question is, will they? Now, if that's a policy question, then you can duck it. But I just have to think to my-self that if they really were a vengeful nation bent upon gaining revenge for all of the wrongs they believe have been committed against them over the last twenty-five or thirty years, they would go after Formosa, and they would go after Hong Kong and seize that rich port and its economic treasures. But they don't do that.

DIRECTOR BUSH: You make a good point. But I would only add, because it will get me closer to policy than I want to get, they would be contemplating how will others respond. And we have a mutual defense treaty at this point in our history with the Republic of China. And anybody in Peking making that kind of decision will obviously be thinking about that. Beyond that, I don't want to go. But it certainly would be an inhibition to adventure. And I think that the people in Peking understand this. On the other hand, that doesn't mean -- I'm not trying to predict what they will or won't do.

SNYDER: Yes, sir. We will continue and get into the business of how Mr. Bush runs the CIA. That we are allowed to talk about, I assume.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, fully.

SNYDER: We can talk about intelligence policy, can't we?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Fully.

SNYDER: Fully. Right after these announcements from our sponsors.

SNYDER: What kind of a job is being the Director of the CIA? Is that a political job? You were appointed to that by the President. You are a Republican. You have run for office. You have worked for the Republican presidency for some time.

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, it's not a political job in the sense of partisan. In fact, when I went into the job, I properly forswore all partisan political activity. Now when I was nominated for the job by President Ford, there was some debate, rather heated debate in the United States Senate as to whether I should be in the job because I'd been Chairman of the Republican National Committee, I'd been a Republican member of the United States Congress.

I convinced the senators, an overwhelming majority of them, that an American citizen can participate in partisan politics with partisanship and with fervor, and when out of that can do a nonpartisan job, as I think I did as Ambassador to the United Nations, as chief of the liaison office in China in nonpartisan fashion.

And so I went down there and said, "Look, I -- I think I can do this job. It's an administrative job; it's a coordinative job; it's a job where the Director must have the confidence of the President and he must have some confidence in the Congress, and I'm not going to be involved in partisan politics. And if I did, I ought to be thrown out, because the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community must be free of partisanship." And I hope I've conducted myself in that manner. And I think I have. And certainly I've tried to. And fortunately for me, because I like the job and I am enthralled with the mission and I'm impressed with the people I work with in terms of their dedication and their competence -- fortunately the United States Senate agreed and I was confirmed. And there were some doubters, and I understand that.

SNYDER: I was going to ask you, do you think the debate over your nomination and your qualifications was a proper debate for the representatives of the people...?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Of course it was. Of course it was proper. And, you know, I'm human, and I didn't like it, and some of the senators said things that I wish they hadn't said. But my goal the minute I was confirmed is not to go back and show a vendetta, but to try to earn the confidence and the respect of those who voted against me for understandable reasons. And only history will tell if I can do that.

SNYDER: How effective have you been in at least gaining some kind of rapprochement with those senadors who did not want you to have the job? Did you actively seek them out on a personal basis afterwards or just let your work speak for itself?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No. I tried to say, look, from this moment on I'm going to do what I said I'd do; butt out of partisan politics, lay aside -- saying to myself, lay aside the debate; bury my own strong feelings about "Why wasn't this guy for me or not," and earn his confidence. And I don't know how it's working. You should ask some of those senators.

But you know, I'm kind of goal oriented. And I'm going to convince them through performance, not through a lot of PR, that the majority was correct. But much more important than any personal thing is, you know, how is the intelligence community running? Good God, these people were subjected to some excessive abuse. I'm not saying everything was perfect in the past, and I'll be glad to discuss that with you. But there has been a piling on....

SNYDER: Well, I want you to know. I might as well say this for the benefit of the people who are watching too. don't think the purpose of this hour should be to go over all of the charges, proved and disproved, of the last five or ten years and try to hold you accountable for you [sic] and say "Now, what are you going to do about that?" I think that

> Thank God. DIRECTOR BUSH:

SNYDER: Well, I think committees of the Congress have done their job properly. I think that the reports have all come out. The record is there for people to see. And obviously you were appointed or chosen by President Ford as Director of the CIA to go forward from the bad old days, if that's

> DIRECTOR BUSH: That's what I want to do.

SNYDER: Which I'm sure my detractors will say, well, I'm letting you off easy. But I don't think....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, but -- yes, some will say that. The sensationalists will say that. But look, intelligence, foreign intelligence is vital to the national security in these troubled times. We know what we're up against. We don't know all about it, but we know enough about it to have just totally convinced me, not only when I was a consumer of intelligence in China, in the United Nations, but now when we produce it and I'm responsible for this -to absolutely convince me that an intelligence capability second to none is vital to legitimate national security.

So I do want to look ahead. And yet I continually have to look over my shoulder. And I'm delighted. You know, if you get some flak out of it, too bad, and you probably will, because there're people who want to still criticize us.

SNYDER: Well, we'll refer those people back to about five

programs we've done on this series with, for example, Mr. Hirsch of the New York Times and other reporters and writers and members of organizations which are anti-CIA. They've all had their say on many occasions, and we've heard it all before. I would like to see what's coming tomorrow rather than worry about what's going on -- or what went on yesterday.

But just one question in that area. When you say you want an intelligence establishment second to none, fine. But there is a feeling I think created by the investigations and by the probings of Congress that we have far too many people working in intelligence in this country, that almost every other person might be a CIA agent or might be an FBI undercover man, or might be with the local police department in plain clothes, and that we have too many people checking on those of us who are not doing any investigating.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, that's a myth. I'm absolutely convinced it's a myth. Our personnel levels are subject to minute scrutiny by the proper oversight committees in the Congress. And if they felt that -- and believe me, they go over every budget figure, personnel ceilings that you mention now, with a fine tooth comb. And if they thought there was excessive staffing, that would have come out in these Senate -- in the Senate report or in the House committee report, or in one of the thirty-seven appearances, official appearances before Congress that I've made in nine months of being Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

And so I'm not saying we can't be more efficient. not saying we can't cut back here or there. But this concept that you accurately portray that Americans feel the CIA has excessive people spying is nonsense. It's wrong.

SNYDER: I had a man on this program who said that there's a very good probability that there could be an employee or two somethere at RCA or NBC. I don't know how many people this company employs; too many in some areas. That this man might also be working for the CIA. Well, now, if I found out that there was a co-worker of mine here who was working for your company and was taking notes on what me and my colleagues did or people who came on this show or any other and sent them down to your office in Langley, Virginia, I'd be highly upset about that....

> DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure you would.

SNYDER: I don't think your agency has any business in this building.

DIRECTOR SYNDER: And we're not in it. And the very fact that he gets credibility by saying that on this show, with no proof, not being compelled to come forward with the facts, gets me -- I

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can't use the phrase I used to use in the Navy. I'm upset about it, because it's not true. And it's been investigated.

SNYDER: It starts with "T" and it rhymes with teedoff. Okay?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, it starts -- yes. I've got to be careful. I don't want to get people calling in. But no, it's not right. And if it were true, it'd be all over every headline. And yet we are living with that kind of myth. Movies come out. Robert Redford and "Seven Days of the Condor," with CIA guys gunning down each other in the United States. Nobody ever alleged that. The sensationalism, the excesses of the investigation. We're kind of propelled into this kind of nonsense, and we have to live with it. But we're professionals. We're patient. We know our mission is important. We know we're living within -- properly now within the constitutional constraints, and we're determined so to do. We're subjected to proper oversight by the President on the executive side, by seven committees of the Congress. And I am very comfortable, as one who prides himself on some sensitivity for the rights of American citizens, with the way the intelligence community is conducting itself.

SNYDER: And isn't it just too bad that the former President really bastardized the CIA through the whole Watergate thing, or it was alleged that he did that to the CIA?

DIRECTOR BUSH: There have been allegations against several former Presidents. People look back at the Bay of Pigs and say, using ninety/ninety hindsight, this was wrong. But my view -- and I do appreciate your not dwelling on the past, though I'll glad to respond to any question you ask about it to the best of my ability....

> SNYDER: I believe it.

DIRECTOR BUSH: But there have been errors, and there have been, using 1976 moral judgments, some condemnations of things in the past. But Tom, we're in a tough ball game, and we better be prepared, we better produce the best intelligence we can; we better have the best analysts, Ph. D.s, MAs; we better have the best security for the premises here and aboard; we better have dedicated people willing to sacrifice. And we've got these things.

And still people who have a little humaneness, a little compassion, a little sensitivity....

DIRECTOR BUSH: We need that, sure.

...and a little romance in their approach to SNYDER: life.

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DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right. It's not a James Bond life that we're in. And yet covert action is a small percentage....

Don't you have a car that shoots -- don't you SNYDER: have a car that shoots noxious gases out the back?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No. And I've not yet met Pussy Galore either.

[Laughter.]

SNYDER: I can help you there.

DIRECTOR BUSH: I don't want any of that. Listen, I've got enough problems running the CIA and the intelligence community.

SNYDER: We will continue with Director Bush after these announcements. I hope you'll stay tuned.

SNYDER: ...nonpolitical nature of your job for a second If somebody from the Committee to Re-Elect President Ford were to call and say the President would like you to make a campaign speech, you would say no.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Not only would I say no. I'm a former Chairman of the Republican National Committee. I didn't go to the convention, didn't go near it; stay away from any political gathering; feel constrained to not even support the candidate of my choice as an American citizen; insist that we -- upon presidential instruction, but that we fully and properly, as we should, brief Governor Carter, the contender, the major contender to the President for the presidency. And if you or anyone else point to anything that I do that smacks of partisanship, I shouldn't be in it. The agency's been under enough fire. And the process -much more important, the impartiality from politics of the process is so important that a Director ought not to be political.

Now, I think I can be a good Director of CIA.

SNYDER: If Jerry Ford called you on the phone tomorrow, which I'm sure he would not do, but if he did and he said "George, I'd like you to go out to Oswego, Michigan and make a little talk," you would say "Mr. President, I'm not going."

> DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I wouldn't, and I'll make....

SNYDER: What would you say?

DIRECTOR BUSH: ...the differentiation for you. I'll make the differentiation for you. He's the President. I'm the head of

one of many executive agencies. I serve at the pleasure of the President. Now if he said -- I'd say, "Mr. President, what is the purpose, or what do you want me to do in Oswego, Michigan?" If he says "I want you to go out and make me look good politically," I'd say "I won't do it." But if he said "There's a group out there that's long been interested in intelligence, and as the President of the United States, they're interested in the executive order that's reformed the intelligence community, and each year the Director of CIA has done this and I'd like you to do it," I'm going to do it.

SNYDER: Such as at the University of Michigan. I understand.

DIRECTOR BUSH: And so we've got to draw the line between, you know, the concern people have that a President might ell the CIA Director to do something improper, and the other line is that there's one President, and he deserves the loyalty and the best judgment of his Director of CIA, just as he does of Interior, HUD, Defense, or whatever it is.

So I don't want to be a free-floating spirit. The CIA must be under the control of the President. And the President should be able to fire the Director of CIA or tell him what to But he shouldn't be able to tell him to do something that's improper.

Your question connoted political impropriety, and that I wouldn't do and, without injecting a partisan note in it, this President wouldn't ask me to do, you see. And so I -- I -- I don't think we've got a conflict on this one, Tom.

SNYDER: What if Jimmy Carter is elected in November? What happens to your job?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I serve at the pleasure of the President. And I would not make it difficult for a new President to get rid of me. And I'll tell you why. I don't believe the agency or the Director of CIA, Director of Central Intelligence or the head of CIA should be partisan. But I do believe strongly that whoever heads the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelligence, must have the confidence of the President. He can't serve intelligence well if he doesn't. And the President is ill-served if he can't have confidence in what the Director is telling him.

And so there is a certain compatibility separate and apart from politics that is in the national interest. And so what happens, I don't know. And I really think it's far less important than whether this community stays strong, the intelligence community. And so I would say "Mr. President, any time you want to get a new man in here, please proceed so to do." And I don't think that is making partisan a nonpartisan job. It's simply my conception of how

government ought to operate.

SNYDER: I don't have historicity in my head as to what happens when a President of a different party comes into office. Do you remember what happened....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Vis-a-vis CIA?

SNYDER: Yes. When Johnson came in, or when Johnson left and Nixon came in.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dulles -- Dulles was eventually replaced by Kennedy. There was a little period of time. I mean President Kennedy replaced....

SNYDER: Replaced Allen Dulles.

DIRECTOR BUSH: ... Allen Dulles. I can't -- I'll be honest; I haven't looked back.

Who was in when -- does anybody in the room SNYDER: know when Johnson and Nixon....

> DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dick Helms.

SNYDER: Well, he remained.

DIRECTOR BUSH: But I don't remember. I thought you were talking about turnovers. I can't

SNYDER: No, I'm just wondering. The minute Kennedy took office from a Republican, Eisenhower, did you fire the CIA Director?

> DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no.

SNYDER: I don't think so.

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no, no, no.

SNYDER: And when Nixon took it from the Democrat, Mr. Johnson, did he fire the CIA Director?

> DIRECTOR BUSH: But in fairness.... No.

SNYDER: And I'm not trying to dictate....

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, but in fairness, Tom, there has never been a Director who has had as active a political past as I have. And so just as I understood the debate on my nomination before the Senate, I would understand a review of my position, if for no other reason than because I had been actively involved on the other side of the political spectrum, you know, should your hypothesis work out.

But again I come back, not trying to sound holier than thou, but that's inconsequential. What really is essential is that the proper relationship be established. And we've got it It's working well. The Director of Central Intelligence is given access to a President that supports the concept of a strong foreign intelligence community. And that's what's essential, whoever is President. And my future, my getting a job really is coincidental.

SNYDER: We will continue after these announcements. I hope you'll stay tuned.

SNYDER: You mentioned that you feel it's proper that Mr. Carter, the Democratic nominee, be briefed on certain items. Who decides how much he will be told?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, in the final analysis, the President. The President's instructions to me, as head of the intelligence community, is the determining factor. But the President took a very broad view. He said I think that it's most important that the -- that Governor Carter be given intelligence briefings. But then I worked out, as the designee of the President, with Governor Carter the parameters of the briefings. And we decided that they should be on intelligence, that they should stay away from policy and that they should stay away from sources and methods, which is a certain code for the things I am to protect under the law. Governor Carter recognized that he didn*t need to know at this juncture the sources and methods of the intelligence. And so our briefings have consisted of finished intelligence. I've attended the two briefings on intelligence, and fortunately for him with me went some of our very top experts in the areas that he was interested in. And we're not holding back. The President has made clear to me he wants Governor Carter fully briefed, and this is what we're doing. And the beneficiary is the United States of America.

SNYDER: Now in the briefings -- and if you can't say, you will just say "I can't say." I understand because I'm a neophyte and I don't want to get into areas of great sensitivity. But do you brief the opposition candidate on methodology, personnel, location, or do you brief him on things that are happening currently in countries where we operate intelligence installations?

It's the latter. We don't go into metho-DIRECTOR BUSH: Sources and methods of intelligence we don't go into.

SNYDER: Like in country "X," Mr. "A" is doing such and such to make sure that political Mr. "B" will not advance.

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kind of thing?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No. We don't go into the source or What we go into is here's the way one conceives the strength of the Soviet Union, for example, where it's up against NATO, you know. Or, here's what we think that might happen in China after Chairman Mao passes on. Or, here's a current intelligence briefing. Here's the status of what might be going on in some area, maybe the Middle East or Africa, or wherever it is.

> SNYDER: I understand.

DIRECTOR BUSH: We stay out of policy. We give him intelligence. We respond to questions. And I hope it's working to his satisfaction. The people at the CIA, the professionals with whom I work, feel that the briefings have gone reasonably well.

> Will there be more before the election? SNYDER:

DIRECTOR BUSH: That depends on what Governor Carter feels he requires.

> SNYDER: I see. Now what....

DIRECTOR BUSH: The President has authorized me to give him what he needs in terms of intelligence briefings.

SNYDER: Has he asked for anything you wouldn't tell him?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Now, Tom, you're getting into

SNYDER: I understand.

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I don't think so. I don't think No. And I don't think we had any differences with the he has. Governor.

SNYDER: What arrangement is there, though, and I'm certain there must be some, between the President and Governor Carter in terms of using information supplied by yourself and your associates as campaign issue or campaign speechmaking source?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I don't -- I don't -- if there is some arrangement that they've discussed, something between them of that nature -- certainly I've not been any intermediary on that kind of an arrangement. I don't expect that kind of an arrangement exists. I think that any recipient of highly classified intelligence in the position of Governor and certainly the President recognizes he's dealing with sensitive information. And I don't expect there will be an abuse of this information.

But should that have been discussed, it hasn't been discussed with me, nor should it be. That would be an arrangement, a policy kind of a thing that would be worked out elsewhere. But I don't believe there's such an arrangement.

SNYDER: Do you know how good you are at doing this kind of television?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I'm trying to....

SNYDER: But you really are good. I'm out of time. you really are good at this, and you should do it more often. would help you, and it would help your company.

Thank you for being here this morning.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank you, Tom.

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Executive Registry

September 16, 1976

Jennifer,

Attached are talking points in preparation for the Director's appearance on <u>Issues & Answers</u> and for other interviews and speeches. The Director may wish to look these over before he meets with Messrs. Wells, Walsh, Zellmer, and me at 1015 tomorrow. I am notifying the participants and am sending each of them the same package.

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ABC News 1124 Connecticut Avenue N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone 202 393-7700

September 14, 1976

Executive Registry

J.F. weekens!

Mr. George Bush Director, CIA Washington Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

We are delighted to confirm your guest appearance on ABC News ISSUES AND ANSWERS Sunday, September 19th.

The program will be "live" at 12 noon from our studios at 1124 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. ... right across the street from the Mayflower Hotel. We ask that you make arrangements to be at the studio at 11:15 for make-up and lighting checks.

We are all looking forward to seeing you then.

Cordially,

Peggy Whedon Producer

"Issues and Answers"

cc:

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P.S. Due to a football schedule locally, "Issues and Answers" will be carried in Washington, only, at 1:30 to 2:00P.M.

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